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It is said by Professor Story that, "A verbal agreement for the sale of
lands or an interest therein may be enforced in either of two cases: first,
when that agreement has been partly performed; and secondly, when to
declare the agreement invalid would work a fraud upon the plaintiff."
2 Story's Equity Jurisprudence78. It is submitted that the principal case
might well be regarded to be either one, or both, of these two cases. The
plaintiff has performed her part of the contract and the consideration given
by her can not be adequately measured in terms of money. It is arguable
that the decedent was, after the performance by the plaintiff, a trustee of
the 40 acres for the plaintiff and that she was entitled to it in equity. Does
not the decedent's failure to convey or devise the land to the plaintiff work
a fraud upon her? And since the plaintiff has paid the consideration
(either on the bargain theory or on the theory of promissory estoppel) for
the promise and in addition has taken possession of a part of the premises,
it is submitted that there has been such part performance as to take the
contract out of the operation of the statute. The court has assumed without deciding, and apparently without noticing, the proposition that possession of a part of the premises is not such a possession as is required to
constitute part performance. Such an assumption seems unwarranted in
view of the fact that this point has never been decided, in this state at
least., The proposition seems dubious on principle and has been so declared
by the text writers and the majority of the few cases in which it has been
considered.
There are a variety of views on the doctrine of part performance and as
many, or more, theories in support of them. Kentucky, Mississippi, North
Carolina, and Tennessee have repudiated the doctrine altogether. In some
states, including Indiana, the fair value of services rendered or benefits
conferred upon the vendor by the vendee in pursuance of the contract may
be recovered in quasi contract, while in other states such a recovery is
denied. St. Joseph, etc., Co. v. Globe, etc., Co., 156 Ind. 665. In most jurisdictions the payment of the purchase money, in full or in part, is not a
sufficient act of performance to take the contract out of the operation of
the statute, but a contrary rule prevails in Delaware by an early decision
and in Iowa by statute, while in Georgia some of the cases recognize payment as sufficient although at least one of the earlier cases does not. In
England, Indiana, and many of the states possession taken in pursuance of
the contract is sufficient part performance. (Brown on The Statute of
Frauds, sec. 467; Peterbaugh v. Peterbaugh, 131 Ind. 289) while other
states require in addition to possession either full or part payment of the
purchase price or improvements made upon the property by the vendee.
While the doctrine of part performance applies to oral gifts of land, or
promises to give land, it is generally required in such cases, to authorize
specific enforcement, that both possession is taken and improvements are
made by the donee. Brown on The Statute of Frauds, see. 467; Swales V.
S. J. S.
Jackson, 126 Ind. 282.
TENANCIES BY THE ENTIRErIES--MAINTENANCB AND SuppoRT-Appellee

brought an action against appellant in the Clay Circuit Court for support;
obtained service on the appellant by publication; the Court rendered judgment, making an allowance to appellee "in the nature of alimony" in the
sum of $2,000, and ordered land held by the husband and wife as tenants by
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the entireties sold by a Commissioner, and one-half the proceeds, after
payment of expenses of sale, attorneys, etc., be paid appellee, "and the other
half, or appellants interest" be paid to the Clerk, by him paid over to
appellee "for her maintenance and support on order as above made." Pursuant to this order, said land was sold. Subsequent to the Clay Circuit
Court action, the wife obtained a divorce and remarried. Appellant brought
the present action to determine title to said real estate. Held, that the
sale was invalid. Baker v. Cailor, 176 N. E. 854.
A tenancy by the entirety is essentially a joint tenancy, modified by the
theory of the common law that the husband and wife are one person. Pray
v. Stebbins, 141 Mass. 219, 4 N. E. 824. By reason of the common law
fiction, husband and wife, being one person in law, were each incapable of
holding any separate interest in any estate so acquired. "They were said
to hold such estate per my et per tout (sic) * * * and neither
owns any severable interest therein." Sharpe v. Baker, 51 Ind. App. 547;
Davis v. Clarke, 26 Ind. 424; Chandler v. Cheney, 37 Ind. 391. In order
to hold property by the entireties, the parties must have been married at
the time of the conveyance to them, and an honest belief in an illegal
ceremony is not sufficient. Morris v. McCarty, 158 Mass. 11. A crop raised
on land held by the entireties is held in the same manner and subject to
the same law as the land itself. Patton v. Rankin, 68 Ind. 245. The most
important incident of a tenancy by the entireties is that the survivor of the
marriage is entitled to the whole, and that this right cannot be defeated by
a conveyance by the other to a stranger, as it can be in the case of joint
tenancy. Pray v. Stebbins, supra; Hiles v. Fisher,144 N. Y. 306; Ketchum
v. Walsworth, 5 Wis. 95, 68 Am. Dec. 49; Simpson v. Pearson, 31 Ind. 1;
Chandler v. Cheney, supra. Nor by a sale under execution against such
other. Hiles v. Fisher, supra; In re Meyer's Estate, 232 Pa. 89, 81 Atl.
145; Simpson v. Pearson,supra; Chandlerv. Cheney, supra; Jones v. Chandler, 40 Ind. 588; Thornburg v. Wiggins, 135 Ind. 178; Mercer v. Coomler,
32 Ind. App. 533, 69 N. E. 202. By common law, when land was conveyed
to the husband and wife, the husband could, during the joint lives, for his
own benefit, use, possess and control the land, and take all the profits
thereof, and he could mortgage and convey any estate to continue during
their joint lives, but he could not make any disposition of the land that
would prejudice the right of his wife if she survived him. Burtles v. Nunan,
92 N. Y. 152. The various state statutes abolishing joint tenancy, or declaring that two or more grantees shall take an estate in common, have,
as a rule, been held not to apply to tenancies by the entireties, Ketchum v.
Walsworth, supra; Dotson v. Faulkenburg, 186 Ind. 417, though some such
statutes have been so worded or so construed. Stewart v. Thomas, 64 Kan.
511, 68 Pac. 70; Louisville v. Coleburn, 108 Ky. 420, 56 S. W. 681. Likewise, what are known as the Married Women's Property Acts are usually
held not to abolish the tenancy by the entireties. Hulett v. Inlow, 57 Ind.
412; Carver v. Smith, 90 Ind. 222; Fisher v. Provin, 25 Mich. 350. Where
real estate is conveyed to a husband and wife and another person jointly, the
husband and wife will take an undivided one-half of the premises as tenants
by the entireties. Anderson v. Tannehill, 42 Ind. 141. When a tenant by
the entireties dies, the survivor holds the entire estate by virtue of the
original grant or device, * * * and therefore on the death of one, the
survivor, being already seized of the whole, can acquire no new or additional
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interest by virtue of his survivorship. Sharpe v. Baker, supra. The spouse
surviving acquires the whole, and, at common law, even tho the wife surviving accepted dower out of the estate as if it had been her husband's. Falls
v. Hawthorn, 30 Ind. 444.
In applying the doctrine of election, the Indiana courts have created
some confusion, which has had its effect on tenancies by the entireties. The
wife is said to be estopped from claiming title as surviving tenant by the
entirety because the provisions of the will were in lieu of her statutory
rights and her acceptance of such provisions precluded her from claiming
such statutory rights. Young v. Biehl, 166 Ind. 357. Where a husband
devised property, including property held by the entireties, in trust for the
wife, and she accepted the provisions of the will, she took by devise which
was subject to transfer and inheritance tax. In re Arp's Estate, 147 N. E.
297, 148 N. E. 427. These decisions may be justified, however, under other
considerations than the law of tenancies by the entireties if the court
worked on the theory of Moore v. Baker, 4 Ind. App. 115, in which it was
held that when the wife elected to avail herself of the benefits of her husband's will, she was estopped to deny his right to dispose of the property,
although title was in her. In citing authorities in the foregoing decisions,
the courts ignored the distinction between the facts of these cases, and those
wherein the wife elected to take under a statute of descent. In these cases
the wife could not take by descent as she already had a vested interest.
There are a number of both English and American decisions that justify
the holding in Moore v. Baker, supra. However, in the light of the generally accepted elements necessary to have a waiver or an estoppel, this
doctrine, initiated in the English courts of equity, and applied to situations
such as Moore v. Baker, supra, is not sound. For further discussion, see
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence,Vol. 1, 4th Ed. Sec. 461ff. The language of
these cases cannot be reconciled with that of Cameron v. Parrish,155 Ind.
329, in which it was said that such an instrument does not present a case
requiring the wife under the equitable doctrine of election, to decide whether
she would accept the benefits therein, and thereby adopt the will as an
entity, and by such acceptance impliedly consent that property owned by
her * * * should be subjected to the provisions of her husband's will.
Any question arising out of such cases concerning inheritance taxes, however, is now governed by statute, under the Acts of 1929, in which the word
"transfer" was defined as including the exercise of the right of survivorship.
In the principal case, the support statute under which the appellee
sought to enforce the sale of property held by the entireties for the wife's
support, provides: "Sale of real estate in proceedings under this act shall
be of the entire fee, and shall direct (divest) the wife's inchoate right
thereto." An inchoate right thereto is not a present estate therein. Rupe
v. Hadley, 113 Ind. 416. A wife's interest in her husband's real estate is
an inchoate right simply. McCormick v. Hunter, 50 Ind. 187; Paulus V.
Latta, 93 Ind. 34; Snoddy v. Leavitt, 105 Ind. 357; Geisendorif v. Cobbs, 47
Ind. App. 573, 584; Rupe v. Hadley, supra. In estates by the entirety each
party has a vested estate. Neither may be said to have merely an inchoate
interest therein. Chandler v. Cheney, supra; Sharpe v. Baker, supra. The
decision in the principal case is an orthodox affirmation of attributes long
recognized in tenancies by the entireties.
L. H. W.

